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Abstract
We present an agent-based model to study firm-bank credit mar-
ket interactions in different phases of the business cycle. The busi-
ness cycle is exogenously set and it can give rise to various scenarios.
Compared to other models in this literature strand, we improve the
mechanism according to which the dividends are distributed, includ-
ing the possibility of stock repurchase by firms. In addition, we locate
firms and banks over a space and firms may ask credit to many banks,
resulting in a complex spatial network. The model reproduces a long
list of stylized facts and their dynamic evolution as described by the
cross-correlations among model variables. The model allows us to test
the effectiveness of rules designed by the current financial regulation,
such as the Basel 3 countercyclical capital buffer. We find that its ef-
fectiveness of this rule changes in different business cycle environments
and this should be considered by policy makers.
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1 Introduction
Financial accelerator mechanisms are well established in recent literature,
showing how business cycle fluctuations can be enlarged by different self-
reinforcing mechanisms. Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990, 1995) and Bernanke
et al. (1999) show the presence of a positive feedback mechanism: a reduc-
tion of asset values held by the entrepreneurs generates an increase of the
borrowers’ leverage and, subsequently, of the risk premium with a consequent
contraction of the economic activity. Indeed, firms are less prone to invest
because they compare a reduced expected profit with an increased cost of
funding; therefore, reduced investments lead again to a lower output in a
vicious circle. The recent crisis, in countries like Italy, shows that a negative
shock on firms’ output makes banks less willing to loan funds, with a con-
sequent credit crunch beside the increase of the interest rate. Riccetti et al.
(2013) couple the explained financial accelerator, called “leverage” acceler-
ator, with the “network-based” financial accelerator proposed by Delli Gatti
et al. (2010). The latter accelerator highlights that the presence of a credit
network may produce an avalanche of firms’ bankruptcies: the bankruptcy of
a firm may bring “bad debt” - i.e. non-performing loans - that affects the net
worth of banks, which can also go bankrupt or, if they manage to survive,
they will react to the deterioration of the net worth increasing the interest
rate to all their borrowers (Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2003, p.145), making
them incur additional difficulties in servicing debt and thus increasing the
weakness of the whole non-financial sector, in another vicious circle. Riccetti
et al. (2016) further enlarges these mechanisms adding the “stock market
accelerator”, also representing possible financial market bubbles, in order to
build a triple financial accelerator.
Starting from the cited literature strand (Delli Gatti et al., 2010; Riccetti
et al., 2013, 2016), in this paper we build an agent based macroeconomic
model able to represent the firm-bank credit network under different phases
of the business cycle. Differently from the cited papers, the business cycle is
exogenous and can be set in order to reproduce various scenarios. Moreover,
the current model performs a series of improving changes and refinements.
Firstly, decisions about output production and capital structure are separ-
ated; with this mechanism, the production function does not necessarily need
decreasing return to scale in order to stabilize the model’s output and we use
constant return to scale. As for the capital structure, we improve the dividend
mechanism including the possibility of stock repurchase by firms. Moreover,
we allow banks to merge in order to avoid the presence of small “empty”
banks (namely inactive banks that are “alive” but without customers). An-
other major change regards the structure of the credit market: firms and
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banks are located over a unitary space and firms may ask credit to multiple
banks, therefore a complex spatial network arises. In addition, the interest
rate mechanism is devised in order to consider the default probability of the
firm asking for credit. Lastly, banks’ credit supply is constrained by Basel 3
rules. The last feature allows us to perform a simulation analysis on banking
regulation, as done in some other agent-based models, such as Neuberger and
Rissi (2012), Cincotti et al. (2012), Krug et al. (2015), da Silva and Lima
(2017), Popoyan et al. (2017) and Riccetti et al. (2018).
Agent-based models are particularly suited for such kind of investigation
which involves the analysis of a multi-layered network of financial stocks and
flows and its macroeconomic implications due to the dispersed interaction of
heterogeneous agents (Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006). Last decades have been
characterized by a blossoming of macroeconomic agent-based models: for ex-
ample, Riccetti et al. (2015) proposed a macroeconomic model in which het-
erogeneous households, firms and banks interact on various markets through
a decentralized matching protocol that successively has been employed in
other papers in order to develop a fully fledged macroeconomic agent-based
model,1 like in Caiani et al. (2016). The model of Riccetti et al. (2015)
showed that the financial leverage (especially bank exposure) is non-linearly
related to the macroeconomic performance, given that as the leverage in-
creases the economy tends to expand though with decreasing gains and up
a certain threshold after which more leverage increases the probability of
crises. The model is also able to endogenously generate business cycles as
well as small and large crises. Other agent-based macro frameworks have
been proposed, for instance in Dosi et al. (2010), Cincotti et al. (2010) and
successive extensions of both papers.
One of the main ingredients of such kind of macro frameworks, which
is at the same time one of the main advantages of using the agent-based
methodology, is the presence of direct interaction,2 in particular regarding
financial networks, which is a characterizing feature of the present paper.
In this way it is possible to overcome a number of limitations arising from
assuming the presence of a Representative Agent: “no financial markets (who
is lending to whom?); no scope accordingly for excess indebtedness (who owes
money to whom?) or for deleveraging (who is reducing their indebtedness to
whom?); no problem of debt restructuring; no meaningful capital structures
(since the single individual is bearing all the risk, it is obvious that nothing
1This research stream comes from previous attempts to develop models with hetero-
geneous agents which interact through decentralized mechanisms, as for instance in Russo
et al. (2007).
2The typical mode of interaction in mainstream macro papers is instead indirect inter-
action, mediated by the price system.
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can depend on whether finance is provided in the form of debt or equity); no
role for bankruptcy”. (Stiglitz, 2011, p. 598). One of the first attempts to
analyze the interplay between financial inter-linkages (with a static network)
and the business cycle is in Delli Gatti et al. (2006), then extended in
Delli Gatti et al. (2010) with a dynamically evolving network with firm-
bank credit relationships. The present paper has its roots in this modelling
tradition,3 highlighting the fundamental role of credit interconnections and
their relation with the characteristics of the business cycle. As explained
above, the explicit description of the network structure of credit and financial
markets allows us to investigate the working of the financial accelerator in
a network economy, and then to take into account phenomena like financial
contagion and bankruptcy chains. The present paper extends the analysis
to incorporate the role of financial regulation, particularly macroprudential
policy to mitigate financial instability mainly through the countercyclical
capital buffer.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in the next Section we
explain the model. Simulation results are presented in Section 3, while Sec-
tion 4 proposes a macroprudential policy experiment on the countercyclical
capital buffer. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Our economy is populated by firms and banks: firms are indexed by i =
1, 2, ..., I and produce consumption goods, while banks are indexed by z =
1, 2, ..., Z and extend credit to firms. The number of firms and banks is
constant and they are uniformly spatially distributed on a line of length
one. Moreover, there is a sketched central bank, while households (as final
consumers, labor suppliers and banks’ depositors) are in the background.
We focus on the credit market where firms and banks interact. A shock
to a firm affects the credit relationship between the firm and the bank: if the
shock is large enough, the firm may be unable to fulfill debt commitments
and may go bankrupt. In a networked economy, the bankruptcy of a firm
may bring bad debt that reduces the net worth of banks, which can in turn
go bankrupt. The rising bad debt and the deterioration of the net worth
have two consequences: a reduction of credit supply and an increase of the
interest rate required by the banking system to all the borrowers, with a
larger risk premium due to the lack of trust in a weak non-financial sector
(namely, increasing banks’ risk aversion). Hence, borrowers may incur addi-
3For a couple of examples including an empirical analysis of credit networks within an
agent-based framework, see Bargigli et al. (2014, 2019).
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tional difficulties in servicing debt, thus increasing the weakness of the whole
non-financial sector and the number of bankruptcies itself. We will describe
the credit market in details in Section 2.3.
We do not explicitly model consumption, labor and deposit markets,
which are in the background. The consumption goods market, in which
households represent the demand side and firms are on the supply side, influ-
ences firms’ profits. The output of the interaction in the consumption market
is considered in the unitary operating profit op (before financial costs paid to
the banks for the received loans) – see Section 2.1 for details – assuming that
unsold goods are thrown away (no inventories). A negative unitary operating
profit represents a circumstance in which a weak consumption goods demand
reduces the revenues below the operating cost (that also implicitly includes
the output of the labor market), causing a loss for the firm.
The deposit market is also in the background: the amount of deposits (equal
to bank’s total liabilities) is set equal to the extended credit. Indeed, bank’s
balance sheet is composed by cash plus credit on the asset side, and deposits
plus net worth on the other side, assuming cash equal to net worth and de-
posits equal to extended credit. In this market, the price, that is the interest
rate paid by banks to depositors, is exogenously set by the parameter rDt
(equal for all banks).
2.1 Firms
Firms borrow money from different banks, produce goods and sell them to
households. The production function is an increasing function of the firm
total capital K. In particular, the production Y of firm i at time t is:
Yi,t = φKi,t (1)
where φ ≥ 1 is a parameter that we set uniform across firms. Ki,t is the sum
of net worth Ai,t and debt Bi,t
4.
However, differently from Riccetti et al. (2013), in the current model the
decisions about output production and capital structure are separated. First
of all, we do not determine Y starting from K, but we follow the opposite
4Compared to Delli Gatti et al. (2010) and Riccetti et al. (2013), we do not assume
the presence of decreasing returns to scale, that is the “financially constrained output
function” where Kβi,t with 0 < β < 1. Even if the model can be calibrated also with the
presence of parameter 0 < β < 1, in this case we are implicitly assuming constant returns
to scale because the economic theory and many empirical studies suggest that firms often
present (at least till a large level of size and complexity) increasing or constant returns to
scale. Moreover, in this way, we avoid the presence of a further parameter.
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way: we define a production target Y ∗ as follows:
Y ∗i,t =
{
Y ∗i,t−1 · [1− U(0, adj)], if opi,t−1 < 0
Y ∗i,t−1 · [1 + U(0, adj)], if opi,t−1 ≥ 0
(2)
In words, the firm decides to expand its output target if in the previous
period it obtained a positive (unitary) operating profit op and vice versa. In
reality, Equation 2 could be generalized using the expected unitary operating
profit opei,t. In practice, we decide to use simple adaptive expectations for our
agents; therefore, in this case: opei,t = opi,t−1. The target amount changes
randomly by a percentage between 0 and adj. adj is a parameter that sets
the maximum percentage change between the two periods.
The total capital target K∗ is determined by simply inverting Equation 1:
K∗i,t = Y
∗
i,t/φ.
Then, the firm tries to increase the owners’ revenues per unit of net worth
by improving the capital structure, that is the relative composition of debt
and net worth. Therefore, defining leverage as the fraction L = B
A
and
following the (Dynamic) Trade-Off theory5, firms fix a target leverage L∗:
L∗i,t =
{
L∗i,t−1 · [1− U(0, adj)], if φ · opi,t−1 ≤ ri,t−1
L∗i,t−1 · [1 + U(0, adj)], if φ · opi,t−1 > ri,t−1
(3)
where ri,t−1 is the interest rate required to the firm in the previous period.
In other words, the firm wants to increase its leverage if the profit per unit
of capital is larger than the cost of debt ri,t−1. We assume that L
∗ can not
exceed the value 5.
Given the target capital K∗ and the target leverage L∗, firms compute the
target net worth:
A∗i,t =
K∗i,t−1
1 + L∗i,t−1
(4)
Consequently, firms calculate the amount of dividends and stocks repur-
chases6 they want to perform in order to eventually reduce their net worth:
Divi,t = max(Ai,t−1 − A
∗
i,t, 0) (5)
5According to the Dynamic Trade-off theory, firms have long-run leverage targets, but
they do not immediately reach them, but rather they adjust toward them during some
periods. In our model, firms try to reach the target immediately, even if they could miss
it because banks do not supply the required credit with a consequent leverage below the
target, or because net worth is below its target and leverage goes above the target as
explained in Equations 4, 5 and 6. For a review on the Dynamic Trade-off theory, see for
instance Flannery and Rangan (2006), Frank and Goyal (2008, 2015), and Riccetti et al.
(2013).
6The stocks repurchase mechanism is here equivalent to an extraordinary dividend.
6
Hence, firm i does not distribute dividends (and does not perform stocks
repurchase) if its net worth is smaller than its target net worth. Now, it
presents a new amount of net worth Ai,t ≤ A
∗
i,t that can be used in the
current period in order to produce goods. Starting from this value, firm i
can compute its target debt B∗ as:
B∗i,t = min(K
∗
i,t − Ai,t, 10 · Ai,t) (6)
where 10 ·Ai,t represents a cap for the required debt equal to a leverage value
of 10, assuming that banks refuse to lend an excessive amount of credit.
Indeed, the target capital K∗ could remain relatively high after a period of
high losses for a firm which presents a level of net worth A below its target.
In this case, the firm could require a very high amount of debt in order to
reach the target capital, thus implying a very high leverage level. Therefore,
in order to prevent an excessive leverage, we fix a cap to the target debt.
Then, firms interact with banks on the credit market and obtain an
amount of credit B ≤ B∗. We assume that the nominal debt requested at
time t is fully reimbursed at time t+ 1, together with the interest payment.
The details of the credit mechanism will be explained in Section 2.3. Firm i
pays an interest rate ri,t which is determined by the following equation:
rFi,t = r
BC
t + rpi,t + 0.1 · c+ µ (7)
where rBCt is the base policy rate set by the Central Bank (moreover, we
assume that the interest rate paid by banks on deposits rDt is equal to r
BC
t ),
rpi,t is the credit risk premium, c is the parameter representing the costs paid
by banks (see Equation 17), and µ is a mark-up parameter. Therefore, the
interest rate is due to components that are exogenous for the firm, but for
the credit risk premium. The latter is equal to:
rpi,t = PD
e
i,t ·
(
1 +
badt−1
Bt−1
)
(8)
where PDei,t is the expected probability of default of firm i, and
badt−1
Bt−1
is
the percentage of aggregate non-performing loans (bad debt) on the aggreg-
ate credit amount extended by the banking system to firms in the previous
period. In practice, in this component, we merge an idiosyncratic inform-
ation on the health of firm i with an aggregate information on the health
of the overall economic system. Indeed, the risk premium decreases with
the financial soundness of the firm (lower PD) as well as with the financial
soundness of the economy (lower percentage of non performing loans), and
vice versa. In particular, the expected PD is computed as the exact prob-
ability of default of the firm, but using inputs adaptively (as done for all
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the other expected values), namely using the values of leverage and interest
rate paid by the firm in the previous period. In practice PDei,t = PDi,t−1,
and the latter is the value taken from the cumulative distribution function
of a Ni,t(αt, stdop) at the value equal to
rFi,t−1·Li,t−1−1
φ·(1+Li,t−1)
. In other words, this is
the default probability for a firm with leverage equal to Li,t−1 and paying an
interest rate on debt equal to rFi,t−1. The use of a Normal distribution with
αt mean and stdop standard deviation is due to the profit mechanism of the
model that we are going to explain.
Given the received credit, firms have a total capital K = A+B and produce
Y following Equation 1. On the produced output Y , firms obtain a unitary
operating profit op. A high realization of opi,t can be thought of as a re-
gime of high demand which drives up the relative gain of the commodity in
question, while a low realization of opi,t can be thought of as a regime of low
demand that may imply losses and even push the firm to the bankruptcy.
opi,t is a random number drawn by Ni,t(αt, stdop), that is a Normal distri-
bution with standard deviation equal to stdop, and mean equal to αt that
is a variable representing the business cycle common to all firms. Indeed,
α is modeled as an auto-regressive (AR) function calibrated on the GDP of
countries, namely Germany and Japan, in which the firm-bank relationship
on the credit market is very relevant for the funding of the firms (differently
from other countries in which the funding is more related to a direct access
to financial markets). Performing some analyses on Germany and Japan
quarterly seasonally adjusted GDP time-series from 1961:1 to 2018:3, down-
loaded from Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), we find that German
GDP can be modeled with an AR(1) with autoregressive parameter equal to
0.84 (p-value largely below 1%), or with an AR(2), while Japan GDP can
be modeled with an AR(1) with autoregressive parameter equal to 0.93 (p-
value largely below 1% too). Consequently, we decide to model our variable
α following an AR(1) with autoregressive parameter equal to 0.9, that is a
value near to the real Japanese value and between the two estimated values.
In particular:
αt = α0 + b · (αt−1 − α0) +Nt(0, stdcyc) (9)
where b is the already cited AR(1) parameter set at 0.9 and the error term
is drawn from a Normal with zero mean and stdcyc standard deviation.
Moreover, we also perform a set of simulations with b = 0.8, that is near
to the real parameter value estimated on German data. However, the model
can perform analyses on different economies (with different gdp time series)
simply modifying the value of parameter b, α0, stdcyc, or the AR structure
of Equation 9.
Given the unitary operating profit, we can compute the overall profit Π
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of the firm subtracting from the operating profit the interests paid on the
debt:
Πi,t = opi,t · Yi,t − r
F
i,t · Bi,t (10)
Profits (Πi,t) determine firms’ net worth:
Ai,t = Ai,t +Πi,t (11)
The firm goes bankrupt if Ai,t < 0, i.e. if it incurs a loss (negative profit)
and the loss is big enough to deplete net worth: Πi,t ≤ −Ai,t. Now, there are
two possibilities. If the firm is still alive, it adjusts its net worth eventually
subtracting the amount Divi,t, representing dividends and stocks repurchases
as described in Equation 5.
Otherwise, if the firm goes bankrupt, two things happened. First, banks
which lent money to that firm compute a bad debt bad on that loan. The
amount of the bad debt for bank z from firm i is equal to the extended loan
multiplied by the loss given default rate (Lgd, that is 1 less the recovery
rate). The Lgd is computed as follows:
Lgdi,t = −max
(
Ai,t +Πi,t
Bi,t
− le;−1
)
(12)
where le is a parameter that represents the percentage amount for the legal
expenditure. Therefore, the bad debt for bank z from firm i is equal to:
badz,i,t = Bz,i,t · Lgdi,t (13)
Second, we assume that a new firm enters in the market with a net worth
equal to the median net worth of the survived firms.
2.2 Banks
As already explained, banks extend credit to firms. The interest rate set by
banks was explained in the previous Section. The amount that banks can
supply is determined with the following equation:
Bmaxz,t = Az,t ·
(
100
6 + CCBt
)
(14)
where 0 ≤ CCBt ≤ 2.5 is the countercyclical capital buffer
7 set by the Cent-
ral Bank – we will discuss the setting of this buffer in Section 4. Therefore,
the credit that can be extended is an increasing function of the net worth of
7https://www.bis.org/bcbs/ccyb/
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the bank. The value 6 is taken by the Basel 3 rule that requires a minimum
Tier 1 capital equal to the 6% of the risk weighted assets (we are implicitly
assuming that all loans have a risk weight equal to 1, and that our net worth
Az,t corresponds to the Tier 1 capital).
Moreover, banks have a further bound in the maximum exposure to a single
counterpart. This is fixed with the following equation:
Bmaxz,i,t = 0.25 · Az,t (15)
indeed, a Basel 3 rule states that a single exposure can not exceed the 25%
of the Tier 1 capital8.
Banks’ net worth Az,t evolves in the following way:
Az,t+1 = Az,t + Prz,t −Divz, t (16)
where Prz,t is bank z profit at time t, and Divz,t is the amount of dividend
paid by the bank to its shareholders. In particular, Prz,t is given by:
Prz,t =
∑
rFi,t · B
nd
i,t − r
D
t ·Dz,t − c · Az,t − badz,t (17)
where rFi,t is the interest rate paid on the credit B
nd
i,t by firm i that has not
gone bankrupt, rDt is the interest rate paid by the bank on its deposits Dz,t,
c · Az,t are the costs paid by the bank determined as a percentage c of the
net worth of the bank, and badz,t is the sum of the losses due to all non
performing loans computed on every defaulted firm that received a credit
from bank z (see Equation 13). As already said, we assume rDt = r
BC
t and
Dz,t =
∑
Bz,i,t.
Dividends Divz,t are computed only for banks that obtain positive profits
(Prz,t > 0):
Divz,t = Prz,t · dbz,t (18)
where dbz,t is the percentage of non retained profit computed as:
dbz,t = 1− (L
B
z,t − 5) · 0.1 (19)
where LBz,t is the leverage of the bank computed as L
B = D
A
, with a cap at 1
and a floor at 0. In other words, the percentage of distributed profit is low if
the bank has a high leverage, because it needs more net worth in order to be
less financially fragile and to be able to extend further credit. In particular,
dividends go to zero when LBz,t ≥ 15, that is near to the maximum possible
leverage computed using Equation 14 (assuming a CCBt near or equal to
8https://www.bis.org/fsi/fsisummaries/largeexpos.htm
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zero). Vice versa, the percentage of distributed profits is high when the bank
has low leverage (till 100% when the leverage is equal or below 5).
The bank goes bankrupt if Az,t+1 < 0, i.e. if it incurs a loss (negative
profit) and the loss is big enough to deplete net worth: Πz,t ≤ −Az,t. If
some banks go bankrupt, two things happened. First we assume a one to
one replacement, with new banks entering in the market with a net worth
equal to twice the median net worth of the survived firms. Second, losses
are distributed on the banking system or are paid by the Government. In
particular, we define the losses LossBt =
∑
Adz,t, where A
d
z,t is the (negative)
net worth of a defaulted banks. If LossBt > 0.5
∑
Az,t, the losses are very
large for the banking system (above the 50% of the overall net worth of
the banking system) and the Government covers them in order to prevent
a systemic crisis. Instead, if LossBt ≤ 0.5
∑
Az,t, LossBt is proportionally
distributed on the net worth of each survived banks. That is:
Az,t = Az,t ·
(
1− LossBt ·
Az,t∑
Az,t
)
(20)
The mechanism to ask to the banking system to cover the losses in order not
to lose the trust of depositors in the banking system is applied in various
forms. Indeed, in many countries losses are often covered by deposit guaran-
teed schemes (for instance in the European Union, depositors are guaranteed
till the amount of Euro 100,000), or healthy banks are sometimes forced to
buy defaulting banks. Even the European Bank Recovery and Resolution
Directive (BRRD), that imposes the bail-in tool, provides for the interven-
tion of a Resolution Fund paid by banks9.
There could be the presence of banks with a very small positive net worth.
In these cases, banks could be too small to satisfy firms’ credit requests and
could remain without customers. Moreover, in every period their net worth
further decrease because, without revenues, profits are surely negative (even
if these negative profits, equal to a fraction of the net worth as determined
by Equation 17, are not large enough to cause a bankruptcy). In order to
avoid the presence of “empty” banks without customers, we imposed that
these banks have to merge. In practice, the “empty” bank with the largest
net worth sum the net worth of all the “empty” banks and the others are
replaced by new banks. If there is only one “empty” bank, it is considered
as defaulted and its net worth is distributed proportionally to the survived
banks. In practice, the net worth of the “empty” bank is subtracted to
LossBt.
9The intervention of a Resolution Fund is up to a maximum of 5% of total liabilities,
subordinated to the condition that at least 8% of total liabilities have already been subject
to bail-in mechanisms.
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In the next subsection, we will describe the credit interaction mechanism
between firms and banks.
2.3 Credit market
Firms and banks interact in the credit market. Firms are allowed to borrow
from different banks. In the language of graph theory, each firm/bank is
represented by a node on the graph and the credit exposures are represented
by links. These links are directed (from banks to firms) and weighted (the
amount lent), and the network is said “bipartite”.
We use a matching mechanism similar to Riccetti et al. (2013b, 2015),
even if in this case all banks fix the same interest rate and, therefore, firms
can not choose the best counterpart in term of the interest rate. Moreover,
in the current model, we provide a spatial location on a line of length one to
each firm and bank. In particular, they are evenly spaced (with space 1/Z
for banks and 1/I for firms).
The matching mechanism works as follows. At the beginning, a random list
of agents in the demand side, namely firms, is set. Then, the first firm in
the list observes all banks and chooses the bank that is able to supply the
largest amount of credit. In the case that more than one bank supply the
same maximum amount, for instance when many banks are able to supply
the whole credit amount required by the firm B∗, the firm chooses the nearest
bank. After that, the second firm on the list performs the same activity. The
process iterates till the end of the list. Then, a new random list of firms is
set and the whole matching mechanism goes on until no further matches are
feasible either because firms obtain all the desired credit or because banks
cannot extend more credit (or they can lend an amount smaller than the 1%
of the credit initially required by the firm: in this case we assume that the
firm is not interested in receiving a so small amount) since they have reached
their regulatory maximum set by Equations 14 and 15.
The structure of the network of credit relationships evolves endogenously.
Indeed, large banks are able to supply large amounts of credit to big firms.
As a consequence, their profits go up and their net worth grows, making
room for even more partners. This self-reinforcing mechanism gives rise to
an endogenous evolution of the credit network that should represent two
stylized facts: (i) the distribution of node degree is right-skewed with larger
banks characterized by a higher number of links (they are “hubs”); (ii) larger
banks supply credit both to large and small enterprises, while small banks
supply credit only to (relatively) small and local enterprises.
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3 Simulations
We study the model by means of computer simulations. We assume that
our economy is composed by 500 firms and 20 banks. Simulations last 500
periods. We discard the first 100 simulation periods in order to get rid of
transient dynamics.
At time t=1, we set the net worth of each firm and bank to 10. We assume
that, when a firm goes bankrupt, it is replaced by a new one with net worth
equal to the median of surviving firms, while when a bank defaults it is re-
placed by a new one with net worth equal to the double of the median net
worth of surviving firms.
As already explained in Section 2.1, we calibrate the parameters in Equation
9 on German and Japanese data. In particular we set: α0 = 2%, b = 0.9,
stdcyc = 0.5%. Based on these values of the parameters, we reproduce a busi-
ness cycle similar to that of the two selected countries. Moreover, we validate
the calibration on the time series of the manufacturing production, given that
our model only considers the manufacturing sector (and, consequently, the
credit market between firms and banks, excluding house mortgages and con-
sumer credit). Indeed, in the same analyzed period (from 1961:1 to 2018:3),
the manufacturing production follows an AR(1) with autoregressive para-
meter equal to 0.33 (p-value largely below 1%) in Germany, and an AR(1)
with autoregressive parameter equal to 0.52 (p-value largely below 1% too)
in Japan, and our simulation outputs present an AR(1) autoregressive para-
meter often close to those values (even if in the 50 Monte Carlo replication of
the baseline parameter setting, the estimated AR(1) parameter on our time
series ranges from a minimum of 0.09 to a maximum of 0.89).
The other parameters are also set in order to obtain values comparable to
actual time series, as aggregate bad debt on total loans (we will call it “bad
debt ratio”), mean loss given default rate, and mean firm leverage, according
to an ex-post validation procedure10. Moreover, the central bank policy rate
rBC (see Equation 7) is fixed at 1%, and the countercyclical capital buffer
CCB (see Equation 14) is set at 1.25, so it is fixed and not “countercyclical”
in these simulations. The setting of a truly time varying “countercyclical”
buffer, CCBt, will be analysed in the policy experiment that we will perform
in Section 4.
10In particular, we fix φ = 3 (eq.1), c = 5% (eq.7 and 17), µ = 1% (eq.7), stdop = 5%,
stdcyc = 0.5% (eq.9), adj = 10% (eq.2 and 3), le = 20% (eq.12).
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3.1 Baseline model results
In this section we report the result of 50 Monte Carlo simulations performed
on the baseline setting. We firstly show the output of a single simulation
and, then, we show the dynamics of the system through the average cross-
correlation function computed on all the 50 simulations.
Figure 1 exhibits the output of a simulation. The first panel shows the
presence of many business cycles, including a large crisis around period 450.
During the large crisis, the amount of non-performing loans and the loss-
given default rate largely increase (third panel in the first and in the third
line respectively), consequently two banks default (second panel in the third
line), and the equity of the banking sector largely decreases (second panel in
the second line). Therefore, firms become relatively larger compared to the
banking sector (first panel in the second line), and a credit crunch follows
(second panel in the first line). Moreover, the high bad debt signals to the
banking system the presence of a downturn, then the credit risk premium
increases (see Equation 8) and the interest rate grows (first panel in the
third line). Some firms are forced to reduce the leverage because of the credit
crunch and some firms decide to reduce the leverage due to the high interest
rates: in the end, firms reduce the amount of external finance (third panel
in the second line). Consequently, firms have to reduce their investments,
leading to a lower output, lower profits, and yet again lower investments, in
a vicious circle, further reducing the amount of internal funds. All in all, the
leverage cycle enlarges the business fluctuations. These mechanisms are at
work also in the smaller downturns of the business cycle (see, for instance,
the downturns after period 100, or before period 200, or around period 400).
To better observe the dynamics of the economic system, we study the
cross-correlation functions among the analyzed variables. Moreover, we com-
pute them on all the 50 simulations in order to have a robust result.
As shown in Figure 2, in the growing phase of the business cycle, both firms’
leverage and bad debt go down (first and second panel in the third line).
We want to stress the fact that the model reproduces an anti-cyclical firm
leverage (at time t=0 in the cross-correlation), as often found in the empir-
ical evidence. Therefore, firms enlarge their debts in order to restore the
leverage target and to exploit the willingness of the banks to lend money
at a low interest rate level (given the low bad debt rate) and in the sub-
sequent periods firms’ leverage grows (again first panel in the third line,
cross-correlations in the right side of the panel). In other words, while a
growing debt is not worrying during the growing phase, due to a growth of
the net worth growth even stronger than debt growth (lowering leverage),
large debt becomes to be a problem when the cycle reverts deflating the net
14
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worth value and increasing the leverage. In the growing phase, debt increases
boosting the production, but after a while this leads to growing instability
that reverts the business cycle. Then, a higher leverage is associated with a
higher interest rate and a higher bad debt (first panel in second and first line
respectively). The latter two variables (mean interest rate and bad debt) are
highly positively correlated: a higher interest rate increases firms defaults
in that period and in the subsequent ones, and a higher bad debt increases
the interest rate in the subsequent periods (second panel in the second line).
Because of these vicious circles (positive feedback mechanisms), bad debt is
highly autocorrelated (second panel in the first line) and largely correlated
to the loss given default rate: in the downturns of the business cycle, the
increase of the probability of default of firms is associated with the increase
of the loss given default rate (third panel in the second line), as shown by
empirical data. The third panel of the first line shows the positive cross-
correlations between bad debt and bank defaults: large credit losses increase
the probability of a bank default in the same and in the following periods,
while a bank default damages the “real” economy because of the consequent
credit crunch, as empirically found in the studies on the financial crises. Last,
in our model, bad debt is positively correlated to bank-firm credit network
density. This is coarsely the consequence of the mechanisms implemented
in the model: when the economy is growing and the banking system is ro-
bust, firms usually manage to obtain the required credit by a single bank;
instead, in presence of a downturn of the business cycle, banks suffer losses
that reduce their capital and prevent them to be able to extend large loans;
therefore, some firms have to ask funds to many banks in order to obtain the
required credit and the credit network becomes denser. This feature of the
model should be verified with empirical data, in order to understand if the
firm-bank credit network density is really positively correlated with the bad
debt level, or if it is negatively correlated (for instance, because few banks are
willing to lend money), or if it is uncorrelated. In our opinion, this feature
could be realistic because, during crises, banks could prefer multiple lend-
ing in order to increase lending portfolio diversification (or, equivalently, to
reduce portfolio concentration risk), and some banks could exploit the good
signal obtained by the fact that another bank has already extended credit
to the requiring firm evaluating it as financially reliable11. Last, simulations
11Tutino et al. (2017), observing the Italian empirical evidence during the financial
and sovereign crises, that is in 2009-2011-2012, show that “while larger intermediaries
and commercial banks registered a contraction of the loans to customers, smaller banks,
cooperative intermediaries and popular banks continued to perform positively in terms of
lending to customers”. Given that small banks extend credits of relatively small amount,
this feature could confirm our guess.
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show the emergence of a network in which large banks are characterized by
a high connection degree, while small banks present a smaller degree with
local customers only.
4 Countercyclical capital buffer
In this section we simulate the model with a time-varying countercyclical
capital buffer. The CCBt is set as follows:
CCBt = max(min((Bgr(t− 1)− 0.01) · parCCB + 1.25, 2.5), 0) (21)
where Bgr(t− 1) is the average growth rate of the credit extended by banks
to firms in the previous five periods. In practice, the countercyclical buffer
is set between 0 and 2.5% (as in Basel 3 regulation) and the value is above
the 1.25% fixed in the baseline scenario, when the credit growth rate exceeds
the 1%, and it is below 1.25% vice versa. We fix the target credit growth
rate at 1% in order to keep it near to the average value observed in the 50
baseline simulations. Consequently, the mean value of the CCB is always
around 1.25% in all the simulations, in order to make comparable the output
of the simulations.
The strength of the deviation from the central value of 1.25% is given by the
parameter parCCB. parCCB is set from 2 to 20 with step 2. For each value
of the parameter we perform a small Monte Carlo, replicating the simulation
10 times (for an overall amount of 100 simulations).
We study the effect of the CCB and of parameter parCCB in terms of the
two following output variables: the mean industrial production growth rate,
and the volatility of the industrial production’s growth rate.These statistics
are calculated, for each simulation, on the time series from period 101 to the
end of the simulation (period 500).
As already said, the mean value of the CCB, computed on the 10 repeti-
tions performed for a given level of parCCB, is always near 1.25%, ranging
from 1.233% to 1.248% (see the row “mean(mean CCB)” in the upper panel
of Table 1). However, the standard deviation, the maximum and the min-
imum values reached by CCBt in the various simulations change depending
on the value of parCCB. In particular, the mean standard deviation has al-
most a linear growth from a very low 0.037% when parCCB = 2, to 0.355%
when parCCB = 20, while the lower bound of 0 and the upper bound of
2.5% are reached if parCCB ≥ 12 (we do not report the standard deviation
and the maximum of the maximum CCB in Table 1).
Given that the mean CCB is stable, while its standard deviation grows, the
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Figure 3: Mean standard deviation of the industrial production growth rate
in the simulation with the worst mean industrial production growth rate, for
different values of parCCB (from 0 to 20).
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mean industrial production growth rate computed on the 10 simulations is
almost unchanged, while the volatility of the industrial production’s growth
rate shows a light and not significant tendency to increase when parCCB
goes up, as shown in Table 1. Therefore, it seems that the introduction of a
countercyclical buffer does not manage to reduce the business cycle fluctu-
ations.
Moreover, we observe that one out of 10 simulations presents a mean
industrial production growth rate much lower than the average growth rate
observed in the other 9 simulations, that is zero when the others have an
average growth rate equal to 0.95% (and ranging from 0.74% to 1.13%).
This simulation also presents a high output volatility. Even focusing on
this simulation characterized by many large crises, the countercyclical buffer
seems to be useless in reducing the mean standard deviation of the industrial
production growth rate when parCCB is low (below 12) and detrimental
when parCCB is high, as show in Figure 3.
4.1 Robustness check with a different business cycle
model
We try to understand if the previous findings are robust to a change in the
simulated business fluctuations of the economy. Therefore, we repeat the
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Figure 4: Mean standard deviation of the industrial production growth rate
in the simulation with the worst mean industrial production growth rate, for
different values of parCCB (from 0 to 20), when b = 0.8 (the AR(1) para-
meter).
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analysis modifying the AR(1) parameter of the Equation 9, that is setting
b = 0.8. This value of the parameter is no more in between the real values
estimated for Germany and Japan, but is quite near to the 0.84 found on
German data. Therefore, for each value of the parameter parCCB (from 0,
that is a fixed and non ”countercyclical” buffer, to 20 with step 2) we per-
form again a small Monte Carlo, replicating the simulation 10 times (for an
overall amount of 100 simulations), and we study the effect in terms of the
mean industrial production growth rate, and the standard deviation of the
industrial production’s growth rate, calculated from period 101 to 500 for
each simulation. We find again that the mean industrial production growth
rate is the same for all the groups of simulations with different parCCB
values. However, in this case, the CCB seems not to be detrimental for the
average standard deviation of the industrial production’s growth rate and,
moreover, to be effective in reducing the standard deviation when it is most
needed, that is in the worst simulations. Indeed, as show in Figure 4, we
repeat the analysis on the worst simulation setting b = 0.8: the countercyc-
lical buffer seems to be useful in reducing the mean standard deviation of
the industrial production growth rate when parCCB is low, that is between
4 and 8. Instead, above 12, it is again detrimental.
In order to check if this U shaped performance is fortuitous, we consider
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the 50 repetitions of the baseline Monte Carlo simulation and we try to find
other simulations with a null mean industrial production growth rate. We
observe that the selected simulation is the worst and that there aren’t other
simulations with this low performance. However, there are some simulations
between the majority of “normal” simulations and the one with null average
industrial production growth rate. We fix a threshold for the mean indus-
trial production growth rate at 0.35% and, consequently, we select two other
simulations showing low growth. We repeat the same analysis, that is we
observe the mean output volatility when parCCB ranges from 0 to 20, in
the two business cycle settings given by the AR(1) parameter b = 0.9 and
b = 0.8.
One of the two simulations confirms the previous findings: when b = 0.9 the
CCB increases the output volatility especially when parCCB > 10, while
when b = 0.8 a U shaped performance emerges. Moreover, in this case the
presence of the CCB is always beneficial in reducing output volatility, and
the best performance is given by parCCB = 8.
The other simulation partially confirms the previous findings: when b = 0.9
the presence of the CCB is detrimental because it increases the output volat-
ility especially when parCCB is relatively high, while when b = 0.8 the
standard deviation of the industrial production growth rate goes up and
down without a clear pattern.
4.2 A possible explanation of the results
From the experiments performed with b = 0.9, we can conclude that the
countercyclical buffer seems to be useless or even slightly destabilizing, es-
pecially when parCCB is high. In other words, when the adjustment of the
CCB is strong, the output volatility tends to increase instead of reducing, as
aimed by the use of the CCB. A possible explanation for the fact that the
CCB seems to be useless could be that the banking system reaches the max-
imum leverage ratio rarely. Indeed, considering the 50 baseline simulations
in periods 101-500, the regulation never constraints the credit amount in 17
out of 50 simulations, and only in 11 simulations the maximum leverage ratio
is reached more than 10 times. Therefore, the presence of a CCB could have
a weak influence. The number of times in which the regulation is binding is
negatively correlated with the average industrial production growth rate (-
0.20) and positively correlated with its standard deviation (+0.77). However,
even when we focus on the relatively “turbulent” simulations, the previous
conclusion does not change when the business cycle is driven by an AR(1)
parameter b = 0.9.
Instead the presence of a CCB seems to be useful when the business cycle
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Table 1: Countercyclical capital buffer average mean, average maximum and average minimum values, and growth
rate average mean and average standard deviation values, computed on 10 simulations changing the business cycle
AR(1) parameter (b=0.9 and b=0.8, in first and second panel respectively), and parameter parCCB from 0 to 20
with step 2.
AR(1): b=0.9
parCCB 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
mean(mean CCB) 1.25 1.248 1.246 1.244 1.242 1.239 1.240 1.236 1.234 1.233 1.235
mean(max CCB) 1.25 1.34 1.51 1.55 1.65 1.76 1.94 1.98 2.02 2.04 2.16
mean(min CCB) 1.25 1.09 0.92 0.75 0.58 0.44 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.12 0.09
mean(mean growth) 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.85
mean(std growth) 1.82 1.88 1.87 1.91 1.97 1.96 2.09 1.98 1.92 1.91 1.94
AR(1): b=0.8
parCCB 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
mean(mean CCB) 1.25 1.249 1.248 1.247 1.247 1.246 1.245 1.244 1.244 1.242 1.242
mean(max CCB) 1.25 1.31 1.39 1.43 1.51 1.55 1.62 1.68 1.73 1.78 1.84
mean(min CCB) 1.25 1.16 1.06 0.98 0.88 0.81 0.72 0.59 0.52 0.47 0.36
mean(mean growth) 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94
mean(std growth) 1.24 1.25 1.23 1.23 1.20 1.20 1.24 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.24
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is driven by an AR(1) with b = 0.8. Focusing on the relatively “turbulent”
simulations, we also find that the best values for the parCCB are around the
middle of the analyzed range, showing a sort of U shaped relation between
parCCB and standard deviation of the industrial production rate of growth.
In other words, a CCB that adjusts mildly seems to be useful in stabilizing
the output volatility. However, this result is based on few simulations and it
should be confirmed by a larger Monte Carlo experiment12.
A possible reason of the different performance obtained by the CCB when
the parameter of the AR(1) changes could be that, if the business cycle is
quite “sticky” (b = 0.9), a credit expansion in a downturn phase could give
credit to firms that are not able to survive and, consequently, it enlarges the
amount of bad debt (and consequently reduces the banking capital) and all
the related crisis mechanisms. Instead, if the business cycle is quite “respons-
ive” (b = 0.8), the CCB can foster the economic recovery, also helping banks
in recovering losses thanks to the profits obtained with the new loans.
Some words of cautions are needed about these conclusions. Indeed, in the
model, the business cycle, that affects the demand of firms, is not affected by
the industrial production. Instead, a credit growth for firms should increase
the aggregate output and, consequently, the aggregate demand. Therefore,
the model should be enriched with a feedback from the aggregate industrial
production to GDP and aggregate demand. However, this simplifying as-
sumption is due to the fact that the industrial production is only one of
many components of the GDP, therefore it is not trivial to properly assess
this feedback. Moreover, the conclusion that a credit expansion (or the pre-
vention of a credit restriction) could not be useful if the “real economy” is
still suffering, could be supported by the recent Italian experience. Indeed,
as reported by Tutino et al. (2017), small Italian banks does not restrict
12We replicate the experiment with b=0.7, that is we perform again 10 Monte Carlo
simulations for each value of the parameter parCCB from 0 to 20 (with step 2). In this
case, the economy works better, with a higher mean growth and a lower growth volatility,
because it is easy to recover from a crisis. Consequently the presence of the CCB is
irrelevant: in 5 out of 11 parCCB cases, including the case of no CCB (parCCB = 0),
the average volatility computed on the 10 simulations is 1.04, and in the other 6 cases it is
included between 1.02 and 1.03, that is minor but with a difference that is not statistically
significant. The CCB is irrelevant probably also because the range of variation is smaller
compared to the cases of b = 0.8 and b = 0.9 indeed, even when parCCB = 20, the average
(on the 10 simulations) maximum value of the CCB is 1.78 and the average minimum is
0.56 (quite far from the theoretical maximum and minimum of 2.5 and 0). The fact that
the CCB is irrelevant confirms the result found with b=0.8, when the presence of the
CCB was on average neither beneficial nor detrimental. However, the fact that now the
performance of the economy is better impedes the analysis on the “bad” simulations, given
that there are no “bad” simulations.
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credit during financial and sovereign crises, and it causes a large amount of
non-performing loans for these banks in the subsequent years, because the
Italian economy does not manage to recover from the fall. Consequently,
many of these banks were acquired by other banks, many were merged, some
were forced to be submitted to the burden sharing (a sort of bail-in) pro-
cedure and the whole system was submitted to a regulatory reform from the
Italian government, because of a structural lack of capital. The problems
of the Italian banking sector in the years after the financial and sovereign
crises reinforce the lack of “real” economic recovery, performing the already
cited vicious circles. Therefore, as a policy advice, we think that the bank-
ing system should be incentivized to enlarge credit extension when there are
the seeds of the recovery, that is the business cycle is approaching its lower
turning point (the “trough”). However, if the regulator is confident in the
banking managers, it can decide to readily use the CCB and leave banks the
possibility to extend credit i f they face good firms and have forward-looking
expectations of economic recovery, and not to extend credit if they face bad
expectations on the future of the “real economy”13.
5 Conclusions
We presented an agent-based model describing the firm-bank credit market
in presence of different business cycle mechanisms, which we exogenously set
in order to reproduce various scenarios.
Compared to other models in this literature strand, we improve the mechan-
ism according to which the dividends are distributed, including the possibility
of stock repurchase by firms, whose financial structure follows the “dynamic
trade-off theory”, that is firms have a leverage target. Also, banks change
their dividend policy according to their financing needs.
In addition, we locate firms and banks over a space and firms may ask credit
to multiple banks, therefore a complex spatial network arises. Indeed, simula-
tions show the emergence of a network in which large banks are characterized
by a high connection degree, while small banks present a smaller degree with
local customers.
13In our model, this mechanism is represented by the interest rate that changes following
firms’ default probability, but it could be further extended including the possible behavior
of restricting the amount of lent credit. Moreover, in our model, banks fix the interest rate
observing the bad debt ratio of the previous period, that is a backward-looking statistics,
while the banks’ choice to extend or not credit should be forward-looking. If the choice of
the banks to extend credit could be useful for CCB functioning, it could also be the cause
of an unsuccessful functioning: banks could be allowed to lend, but they do not want to
do it.
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The model reproduces a long list of stylized facts and their dynamic evolution
as described by the cross-correlations among model variables. For instance,
we find: a pro-cyclical loss-given default rate (when the economy is in re-
cession, banks face more firm defaults and the recovery rate in these default
procedures is lower), a positive relationship between firms and banks defaults,
a cyclical relationship between firms’ leverage and interest rate required by
banks to firms (when firms’ leverage grows then interest rates increase, while
when interest rates increase then firms’ leverage decreases), a positive re-
lationship between firms’ defaults and interest rates, a cyclical relationship
between firms’ leverage and firms’ defaults (when firms’ leverage grows then
defaults increase, and when defaults increase then credit is constrained and
firms’ leverage reduces). Moreover, simulations contain sporadic but very
large crises of the banking sector.
However, as explained in the previous Section, the model could be further
developed, for instance including a feedback from the endogenous aggregate
industrial production to GDP and aggregate demand, that are completely
exogenous in the current model.
The model allows the analysis of the dynamic evolution of the credit
network in different business cycle phases, and gives us the possibility to
test the effectiveness of financial regulation rules. Therefore, we decide to
observe the effectiveness of the Basel 3 countercyclical capital buffer and we
find that it is useless or even slightly destabilizing when the business cycle is
quite “sticky” (higher value of the AR(1) parameter used for the industrial
sector operating profit), while it seems to be useful when the business cycle
is quite “responsive” (lower value of the AR(1) parameter). This result has a
very important implication for Central Banks (and policy makers in general),
because it signals the importance of considering the features of the business
cycle when designing financial regulation: the same rule could be useful in a
country and dangerous in another (no “one size fits all”).
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